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Abstract. In this paper, a variant of the Hill cipher is proposed. In the classical
Hill cipher, an invertible matrix is used for encryption but the scheme is vulnerable to
the known-plaintext attack which can reveal the matrix. In our proposed cryptosystem,
each plaintext block is encrypted by a new invertible key matrix that thwarts the known-
plaintext attack. To generate the invertible matrices which serve as the dynamic keys
we make use of the vector spaces, randomly generated basis and non-singular linear
transformation. Resulting cipher is secure against the known-plaintext attack.
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1. Introduction
There has been the requirement of secure communication since thousands of years which
led the way for the invention of cryptography. Cryptography enables two persons let’s
say Alice and Bob to communicate securely in the presence of an adversary and this
can be done using the symmetric key or asymmetric key or both type of cryptography
[8]. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to symmetric key cryptography (in particular
Hill cipher) which involves prior sharing of a secret key between Alice and Bob. Hill
cipher is one of the oldest known polyalphabetic cipher invented by Lester Hill [5] but is
vulnerable to many attacks (e.g. known plaintext attack). Despite all these vulnerabilities
it is still gaining the attention of many researchers because of its simplicity, ability to
disguise the letter frequencies and importance in educational systems. Yeh et al. [13]
proposed an improvement of Hill cipher by presenting a polygraph substitution algorithm.
Although their algorithm is safe against known-plaintext attack but as discussed in [11]
it is inefficient for bulk data and time-consuming. Sadeenia [12] gave a way for enhancing
the security of Hill cipher by randomly permuting the rows and columns of a master key
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matrix and use them as a dynamic key matrix. The encrypted plaintext and encrypted
permutation vector are transferred at the receiver end. Clearly each plaintext is encrypted
via new matrix but the known-plaintext attack can still be applied on permutation vector,
i.e. same vulnerability as in Hill cipher. A modification similar to [12] is proposed in [3].
This involves the use of a pseudo-random permutation generator by both the sides and
sharing of necessary permutations with the receiver. Ismail et al. [7] proposed a variant
of Hill cipher known as HillMRIV that uses a different key matrix for each plaintext block
instead of using a single key matrix for every plaintext block. This increases the security
of Hill cipher by thwarting the known-plaintext attack, but the encryption scheme has a
severe issue regarding the invertibility of the key matrix which is nowhere discussed in the
paper. Mahmoud [10] gave a modification based on the generation of dynamic encryption
key matrix by exponentiation with the help of eigenvalues HCM-EE. A modified Hill
cipher based on circulant matrices is discussed in [11] and claimed to be secure against
chosen-plaintext as well as known-plaintext attack. But [4] showed that it is vulnerable
to both the attacks. Acharya et al. [1] proposed an algorithm termed as AdvHill which
make use of the involutory key matrix for both encryption and decryption and so there is
no need to compute inverse key matrix. Agrawal and Gera [2] produced a new method for
encryption in which hill cipher is generated with elliptic curves. This method increases
security but is inefficient because of the structure of elliptic curves.
In this paper, we introduce a new variant of Hill cipher. More specifically, we propose
a vector space-based approach in which dynamic keys are produced with the help of a
non-singular transformation and basis. We also show that our scheme is secure against
the known-plaintext attack. Rest of the paper is designed what follows: All the necessary
definitions are accumulated in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the proposed scheme.
Much required security analysis of the scheme is discussed in Section 4. An example of
the feel of scheme is given in the last section.
2. Preliminaries
Definition 1. Field [9] : A set F is a field having addition and multiplication operations
with the following properties:
(1) existence of an additive identity 0 and a multiplicative identity 1.
(2) additive inverses, multiplicative inverses for everything except 0 and the distribu-
tive law.
(3) rules of associativity and commutativity of both addition and multiplication.
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Example 1. The set R of all real numbers set Q of all rational numbers and set Fp of
integers modulo p, i.e. {0, 1, · · · , p− 1} for a prime p are some examples of field.
Definition 2. Vector Space [6] : Let V be a set and F be some field. Then V is said to
be a vector space over F if
(1) under vector addition the following properties hold:
(a) for all, α, β ∈ V, α + β ∈ V .
(b) for all, α, β ∈ V, α + β = β + α.
(c) for all, α, β, γ ∈ V, α + (β + γ)= (α + β) + γ.
(d) for all, α ∈ V, α + 0= α.
(e) for all, α ∈ V, ∃ a unique −α ∈V such that α + (−α) = 0.
(2) under scalar multiplication following properties hold: For α, β ∈ V and c1, c2 ∈ F
(a) 1α = α.
(b) (c1c2)α = c1(c2α).
(c) c(α + β) = cα + cβ.
(d) (cl + c2)α = c1α + c2α.
where 1 is unity of F
Example 2. Let V be the set of all n-tuples (xl, x2, · · · , xn) of scalars xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in
F . Then V forms a vector space over F under the vector addition defined by
(α+ β) = (x1 + y1, x2 + y2, · · · , xn + yn)
and scalar multiplication defined by
cα = (cx1, cx2, · · · , cxn)
and written as Fn, where α = (xl, x2, · · · , xn), β = (yl, y2, · · · , yn) and c ∈ F .
Definition 3. Span of a set: Let v be an element of vector space V over the field F .
Then v is said to be a linear combination of vectors v1, v2, · · · , vn in V provided there
exists scalars x1, x2, · · · , xn in F such that
v = x1v1 + x2v2 + · · ·+ xnvn.
Let S = {v1, v2, · · · , vn}. Then the set of all possible linear combination of elements of S
is called span(S).
Definition 4. Linear Independence: Let V be a vector space over the field F . A subset S
of V is said to be linearly dependent if there exist vectors s1, s2, s3, ..., sn in S and scalars
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c1, c2, c3, ..., cn in F , not all 0 such that
c1s1 + c2s2 + c3s3 + ...+ cnsn = 0.
A set which is not linearly dependent is called linearly independent.
Definition 5. Basis and Dimension: Let V be a vector space over the field F . A basis
for V is a linearly independent set of vectors in V which spans V .The number of elements
in the basis of V is its dimension.
Example 3. The vector space Fn over the field F is n-dimensional vector space.
Definition 6. Linear Transformation: Let V and W be two vector spaces over the field
F . A map T : V → W is said to be the linear transformation provided
T (aα + bβ) = aT (α) + bT (β)
for all α, β ∈ V and a, b ∈ F .
Definition 7. Non-singular Linear Transformation: A linear transformation T : V →W
is non-singular if for any v ∈ V , T (v) = 0 implies v = 0.
2.1. Hill Cipher. Hill cipher was invented by Lester S. Hill in 1929 which is a polyalpha-
betic cipher. Before encryption, the plaintext message is broken into blocks of length say
m. Then each plaintext block is encrypted using an invertible matrix of size m to obtain
the corresponding ciphertext block of the same length. Decryption can be done simply
by using the inverse of the matrix used for encryption. Mathematically, encryption and
decryption process in Hill cipher is as follows: Define P = C = (Z26)
m which means digits
of the message and ciphertext are ranging from 0 to 25. Let
K = {K |K is m×m invertible matrix over Z26}.
For a key K ∈ K, define the encryption function
e : K × P → C : e(K, x) = xK
and the decryption function
d : K × C → P : d(K, y) = yK−1
where all the operations are in Z26.
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3. Proposed Hill Cipher Algorithm
In this section, we introduce the variant of Hill cipher based on vector spaces. Let p be
a large prime and Fp be the corresponding field. Let
V =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xn) : xi ∈ Fp, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
be a vector space of dimension n over the field Fp and T : V → V be a non-singular
linear transformation.Since every non-singular linear transformation corresponds to an
invertible matrix over the field Fp, T can be seen as an element of GL(n,Fp) which is a
group of all n×n invertible matrices over the field Fp. We choose a T whose order is large
in GL(n,Fp). Rationale behind choosing this T is discussed later on.
3.1. How to construct T . It is well known that the vector space of all n × n matri-
ces M(n, F ) over a field F is isomorphic to the vector space HomF (V, V ) of all linear
transformation on an n-dimensional vector space V over F [6] . Mathematically,
M(n, F ) ∼= HomF (V, V ).
This means,any invertible matrix in M(n, F ) can be seen as a non-singular linear trans-
formation.
Example 4. Let A =
[
4 2
0 3
]
be a 2× 2 invertible matrix over the field F5. Then
T : V → V : T (x, y) =
[
x y
] [4 2
0 3
]
= (4x, 2x+ 3y)
is the required non-singular linear transformation on the 2-dimensional vector space V .
3.2. Way of writing the plaintext. Write the plaintext message in blocks of length
n where n is some positive integer (add padding if required), i.e. m = m1m2 · · · where
mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , · · · , m
n
i ) is i
th message block of length n with mji ∈ Fp for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
3.3. Whitening process. Choose a random 1 × n non zero vector I1 = (I
1
1
, I2
1
, · · · , In
1
)
with I i
1
∈ Fp, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This vector is used for whitening of the first message block. For
this, simply add I1 and m1 modulo p. Let
m′
1
= m1 ⊕p I1.
For the whitening of subsequent blocks, we make the use of the non-singular linear trans-
formation T in the following manner: Let mi is the i
th, i ≥ 2 message block and
Ii = T (Ii−1) = (I
1
i , I
2
i , · · · , I
n
i ) (mod p), for i ≥ 2,
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Figure 1. Whitening Process for a Message of Three Blocks
m1
m1 ⊕p
I1 = m
′
1
I1
m =
m1m2m3
m2
m2 ⊕p
I2 = m
′
2
I2
I1, T (I1) =
I2, T (I2) =
I3
m3
m3 ⊕p
I3 = m
′
3
I3
i.e. Ii is obtained from Ii−1 by applying T on it. Now the i
th, i ≥ 2 whitened message
block is
m′i = mi ⊕p Ii.
This process is included as a part of encryption to overcome the problem of a message
block with all entries 0 and for enhancing the brute force complexity in comparison to
that of Hill cipher. Figure 1 represents this process schematically where ⊕p is the same
as the addition of modulo p.
3.4. Key Generation Scheme. Choose a random basis of V . For that, we need an
invertible n× n matrix over Fp. If p is a large prime, then the probability of a randomly
selected n × n matrix to be invertible modulo p is approximately 1. Therefore, any
randomly selected n× n matrix over Fp is probably invertible. If not so, choose another
random matrix. Within a few choices, we get the invertible matrix. So, let A1 be the
chosen invertible matrix, i.e. A1 ∈ GL(n,Fp) (the group of all n × n invertible matrices
over Fp). This is the key matrix for encrypting first whitened block and the set of all rows
(let’s say B1) of A1 serves the purpose of a random basis.
Since T is a non-singular linear transformation, it maps basis to basis and therefore
by giving a random basis as a seed, it will generate a sequence of basis {B2, B3, · · · , }.
From this sequence of basis, we obtain a sequence of matrices in GL(n,Fp) by putting
the elements of Bi as the rows of Ai for i ≥ 2 and these matrices serve as dynamic keys
for the proposed algorithm. Figure 2 represents this scheme schematically.
3.5. Encryption Scheme. First, encrypt m′
1
with the key matrix A1 by simply multi-
plying both modulo p. This yields ciphertext
c1 = m
′
1
⊗p A1.
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Figure 2. Key Generation Process for a Message of Three Blocks
GL(n, p)
A1 B1, T
A2
T (B1) =
B2
A3
T (B2) =
B3
Figure 3. Encryption Process for a Message of Three Blocks
m′
1
m′
1
⊗p
A1 = c1
A1
m′ =
m′
1
m′
2
m′
3
m′
2
m′
2
⊗p
A2 = c2
A2 A1, A2, A3
m′
3
m′
3
⊗p
A3 = c3
A3
For encrypting ith, i ≥ 2 message block, we use the key matrix Ai defined in Subsection
3.4. Corresponding ciphertext is
ci = m
′
i ⊗p Ai.
Figure 3 represents this scheme schematically where ⊗p represents multiplication modulo
p.
3.6. Symmetric key. Symmetric key of the scheme consists of the following:
(1) Initial vector
(2) Non-singular linear transformation
(3) Basis of the vector space.
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3.7. Decryption Scheme. Since the initial vector I1, non-singular linear transformation
T and invertible matrix A1 are known at the receiver (say Bob) end, he calculates all the
required keys and whitening vectors. To get the ith plaintext block, following operation
is needed to perform by the receiver:
mi =
(
ci ⊗p A
−1
i
)
⊖p Ii
where ⊖p represents subtraction modulo p.
3.8. Rationale behind choosing T . We have chosen the non-singular linear transfor-
mation T over the vector space of dimension n having large order t (by order, we mean
the order of T in GL(n,Fp) ). If this is not the case, then the key matrices may start
repeating themselves before encryption of t− 1 blocks. To avoid this, we have chosen the
non-singular transformation of large order.
4. Security Analysis
Our encryption scheme is such that the key matrix used to encrypt any whitened
message block is invertible. In this scheme, message block with all zero entries is not
encrypted to the same block because of whitening. Further, change in one entry of initial
vector changes the entire ciphertext and this highlights the importance of the initial vec-
tor. Brute force complexity and resistance to various attacks are discussed in subsequent
subsections.
4.1. Number of key matrices. Let V be the same n-dimensional vector space over Fp
considered in Section 3. Then number of basis of V are
N = (pn − 1)(pn − p) · · · (pn − pn−1).
In other words, we have N invertible matrices which can serve as dynamic keys. If both
p and n are large, then the number N becomes so large that it makes the brute force
infeasible, e.g. if n = 128 and p = 29, then N > 2128 which is cryptographically secure
even with the best available computation facility. This shows that brute force complexity
of this cipher is greater than that of classical Hill cipher.
4.2. Security against known-plaintext attack. Suppose the attacker is available with
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (mj, cj), j ∈ J where J is some index set. Since different keys
are used for encrypting different message blocks, so to find the key matrix used for en-
crypting jth message block, an attacker can incorporate only one plaintext-ciphertext pair
(mj , cj) provided initial vector and linear transformation is known to the attacker which
itself is an uphill battle. This gives the linear system of n equations with n2 unknowns
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and solving this system yields infinitely many solutions. Therefore, our proposed scheme
thwart the known-plaintext attack.
4.3. Completeness effect. Each letter of ciphertext block in this scheme depends on
all letters of corresponding plain text block. So our proposed scheme has completeness
effect.
5. Example
Example 5. Let V = {(v1, v2, v3) : vi ∈ F29 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3}. Clearly F = F29 and
length of the message block to be encrypted is 3. Further, consider the non-singular linear
transformation T : V → V defined by
T (v1, v2, v3) = (v1 + v2, 3v2 + v3, v1 − v2 + v3),
initial vector I1 = (2, 1, 5) and the random basis
B1 = {(1, 2, 0), (3, 1, 0), (1, 28, 4)}.
Let m = m1m2m3m4m5m6, where
m1 = (12, 0, 17), m2 = (2, 7, 5), m3 = (14, 17, 22),
m4 = (0, 17, 3), m5 = (0, 19, 5), m6 = (8, 21, 4)
is the message. Initial whitening of the message yields m′
1
m′
2
m′
3
m′
4
m′
5
m′
6
, where
m′
1
= (14, 1, 22), m′
2
= (5, 15, 11), m′
3
= (25, 18, 23),
m′
4
= (12, 21, 14), m′
5
= (16, 13, 24), m′
6
= (18, 22, 16).
Dynamic keys for the encryption are
A1 =


1 2 0
3 1 0
1 −1 4

 , A2 =


3 6 −1
4 3 2
0 1 6

 , A3 =


9 17 −4
7 11 3
1 9 5


A4 =


26 18 −12
18 7 −1
10 3 −3

 , A5 =


15 13 −4
25 20 10
13 6 4

 , A6 =


−1 6 −2
16 12 15
19 22 11

 .
Corresponding ciphertext is c1c2c3c4c5c6 with
c1 = (10, 7, 1), c2 = (17, 28, 4), c3 = (26, 26, 11),
c4 = (18, 28, 25), c5 = (7, 3, 17), c6 = (0, 28, 6)
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where all the operations are performed under modulo 29. Decryption can be performed
easily by computing the inverses of key matrices and knowledge of initial vector.
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